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This paper analyzes correspondence between Reichenbach and Einstein from the spring of 1926,
concerning what it means to ‘geometrize’ a physical field. The content of a typewritten note that
Reichenbach sent to Einstein on that occasion is reconstructed, showing that it was an early version of
Section 49 of the untranslated Appendix to his Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, on which Reichenbach
was working at the time. This paper claims that the toy-geometrization of the electromagnetic field
that Reichenbach presented in his note should not be regarded as merely a virtuoso mathematical
exercise, but as an additional argument supporting the core philosophical message of his 1928
monograph. This paper concludes by suggesting that Reichenbach's infamous ‘relativization of geo-
metry’ was only a stepping stone on the way to his main concern—the question of the ‘geometrization
of gravitation’.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern PhysicsAber ich kann auch da das Gefühl des Künstlichen nicht
los werden—Reichenbach to Einstein, March 16, 19261. Introduction
In the late 1950s, Hans Reichenbach's second wife Maria
Reichenbach edited an English translation (Reichenbach, 1958) of
his Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928). This edi-
tion was missing a long Appendix entitled ‘Die Weylsche Erwei-
terung des Riemannschen Raumbegriffs und die geometrische
Deutung der Elektrizität’ (‘Weyl's Extension of Riemann's Concept
of Space and the Geometrical Interpretation of Electromagnetism’).
A translation of the Appendix was prepared in a nearly publishablet The Hebrew University of
). The Collected Papers of
ceton: Princeton University
s Reichenbach Papers
is Stichting: Schlick Nachlass
rum Scientiarum, Doblerstrae
.de, mgiovane@caltech.eduform (including a transcription of the quite heavy mathematical
apparatus), and the typescript is preserved in the Reichenbach
Archives in Pittsburgh (HR, 041-2101). However, the publication
must have been withdrawn subsequently. Except for a ‘dead link’ to
a no-longer-existing Section 46 on page 17, even today many
readers of The Philosophy of Space and Time might be unaware that
such an Appendix ever existed.
The decision not to publish the Appendix is understandable.
The text is quite demanding for readers unaccustomed to the
formalism, and struggling through it may not have been worth
the effort. After Einstein's death in 1955, the very project of a
unified theory of gravitation and electromagnetism, which
Reichenbach discusses with a plethora of technical details, was
nearly unanimously regarded as a relic of the past (but see
Tonnelat, 1955)—not least of which by Hermann Weyl, one of the
project's initiators (Weyl, 1956). In the same spirit, in an English
translation of a selection of Reichenbach's writings from the late
1970s (Reichenbach, 1978), the pages dealing with “Weyl's gen-
eralization of Riemannian space” were omitted because, as the
editors write, they had “no historical significance” (Reichenbach,
1978, 2:3).
Only a year later, however, a pathbreaking paper by Coffa
(1979) proved that this judgment was hasty. Rediscovering Weyl
2 Very roughly this line of thought can be described as follows. Around 1918, in
order to eliminate the last ‘distant geometrical’ remnants of Riemannian geometry,
Weyl introduced what he called the ‘length connection’ φi. It determines the
change of the length of a vector on parallel transport just as the ‘affine connection’
Γikl in Riemannian geometry determines the change of its direction (Weyl, 1918a,
1918c, 1919a). φi could be identified with the electromagnetic four-potential.
Eddington (1921) radicalized Weyl's approach, using only the affine connection as
the fundamental quantity. A generally non-symmetric Ricci tensor (RikaRki) can be
derived from it and split into an antisymmetric part Fμν identified with the elec-
tromagnetic tensor and a symmetric part Rμν corresponding to the gravitational
potentials (by introducing the ‘natural gauge’ Rμν ¼ λgμν where λ is the cosmolo-
gical constant). Einstein tried to specify the equations that govern the affine con-
nection in Eddington's approach in three brief notes (Einstein, 1923d, 1923e, 1923f).
In the latter theory, the electromagnetic field cannot exist in a place with vanishing
current density. Schouten (1924) showed that this problem disappears if one
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pun) a fertile line of research which, much later, would bear fruit
in the work of Ryckman (1995, 1996, 2005), Rynasiewicz (2005)
and others (see also Giovanelli, 2013b). It was in this context that
Coffa provided perhaps the first and only detailed analysis of the
untranslated Appendix to the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre. In
fact, Coffa read the Appendix as single-mindedly trying to “exhibit
the vacuity of Weyl's enterprise” (Coffa, 1979, 295). Here, however,
Coffa's major achievement becomes a hindrance. Despite the
Appendix's somewhat misleading title, by interpreting it exclu-
sively in terms of the Weyl–Reichenbach debate, we do not fully
grasp its meaning.
Letters between Reichenbach and Einstein, preserved in the
Einstein Archives in Jerusalem (AEA),1 suggest that the Appendix
should be read more broadly. In the spring of 1926, Reichenbach,
after making some remarks on Einstein's newly published metric-
affine theory (Einstein, 1925b), sent him a note offering what looks
like his own attempt at a unified field theory. Reichenbach's note
turns out to have been an early draft of Section 49 of the Appendix,
on which he was working at the time. Einstein's objections and
Reichenbach's replies reveal that criticism of Weyl's theory was
only part of the story. Reichenbach was mainly interested in the
very idea of the ‘geometrization’ of a physical field. At the time,
many believed that if general relativity geometrized the gravita-
tional field, then it was also plausible to geometrize the other
known field—the electromagnetic field. To challenge this view,
Reichenbach conducted what might be called an ‘epistemological
experiment’.
Reichenbach constructed a toy-theory establishing a connection
between electricity and geometry which, he argued, was just as
good as the one general relativity established between gravitation
and geometry. Reichenbach's theory, however, was clearly not as
successful as general relativity. Thus, Reichenbach could provide
‘experimental’ evidence that the geometrization of a physical field
cannot be regarded in itself as a physical achievement. As soon as
Einstein understood the ‘ironical’ nature of Reichenbach's enter-
prise, he immediately agreed with him. As Lehmkuhl (2014) has
recently shown, it was in his correspondence with Reichenbach that
Einstein pointed out, for the first time, that general relativity had
not geometrized the gravitational field.
As we shall see, Einstein and Reichenbach's opinions about the
geometrization issue were only superficially similar. However,
reading Reichenbach's 1928 monograph against the background of
this issue reveals a quite different view of his interpretation of
general relativity. If general relativity dressed the gravitational field
in a geometrical ‘cloak’, as Reichenbach put it, “one should not
confuse the cloak [Gewand] with the body which it covers”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 354; tr. HR, 041-2101, 493). The Appendix of his
book was meant to show that one can, with some sartorial skill,
always dress a physical field in a geometrical disguise. To under-
stand why general relativity is a successful physical theory we have
to look beyond the geometrical clothing to the body it hides. In
general relativity the connection turned out to be heuristically
powerful; it led to new testable predictions. In contrast, the link
between electricity and geometry established by Reichenbach's
theory simply recast what was already known in geometrical terms.
This paper suggests that the geometrization issue was not just a
spin-off of Reichenbach's 1928 monograph, but possibly the core
message of the book. To support this claim the paper proceeds as
follows. Section 2 describes the context in which Reichenbach
decided to send Einstein a note on the geometrization of the
electromagnetic field. Section 3 offers a reconstruction of Reich-
enbach's note. Section 4 describes Einstein's initially skeptical,1 The correspondence will appear in the forthcoming 15th volume of CPAE.then approving, reaction to the note. Section 5 shows what
Reichenbach's Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre looks like if read
from the perspective of the Appendix. Finally, analyzing Reich-
enbach's attitude towards Einstein's distant parallelism field the-
ory, Section 6 emphasizes the differences that existed behind
Reichenbach and Einstein's apparent agreement on the issue of
geometrization. This paper concludes by suggesting that Reich-
enbach's well-known ‘relativization of geometry’ was only a
stepping stone on the way to his main concern—the question of
the ‘geometrization of gravitation’.2. Reichenbach's Γ-critique and his note on the unified field
theories
On June 5, 1925 Einstein, who had just returned from a long
trip to South America (see his travel diary, CPAE, Vol. 14, Doc. 455,
March 5–May 11, 1925), wrote to Michele Besso about the state of
his research on a unified theory of the gravitational and elec-
tromagnetic fields (Goenner, 2004; Sauer, 2014; Vizgin, 1994). He
revealed to Besso that he had become disillusioned with the
whole “Weyl–Eddington–Schouten line of thinking,” the frame-
work in which he had been working in the previous years,2 and
that he was already “on another track, that is physically more
grounded” (Einstein to Besso, June 5, 1925; Speziali, 1972, 240).
The paper Einstein was referring to—the first in which the term
‘unified field theory’ appears in the title—was presented at the
Prussian Academy during its July 9, 1925 session (Einstein,
1925b).
Einstein described “the egg” he “recently laid” to Besso some
weeks later (Einstein to Besso, July 28, 1925; Speziali, 1972, 209–
210). The theory introduced an affine connection (Γτμν) (from
which the Riemann and Ricci tensor Rμν are derived), and inde-
pendently the metric tensor gμν (and its correspondent contra-
variant tensor gμν and tensor density gμν). Einstein then built the
scalar density H ¼ gμνRμν and postulated the independent varia-
tion δ
R
H dt ¼ 0, with respect to the gμν and Γτμν (Ferraris,
Francaviglia, & Reina, 1982). After some manipulation he obtained,
at first approximation, the already-known laws of gravitation and
electromagnetism. The symmetric part of the gμν represents the
‘gravitational potentials’, and the antisymmetric part the ‘electro-
magnetic field strength’ (Einstein to Besso, July 28, 1925; Speziali,
1972, 209–210).
Einstein's enthusiasm for this approach was again a flash in the
pan. The paper was published in September, but by Christmas of
1925 Einstein confessed his skepticism to Besso, revealing that he
had returned to a set of field equations he had presented in 1919
(Einstein, 1919), with the electromagnetic stress-energy tensor
serving as the source (Einstein to Besso, December 25, 1925;assumes that the displacement is not symmetrical. For more details see the clas-
sical literature on the history of the unified field theory (Goenner, 2004; Vizgin,
1994). An excellent non-technical presentation is provided by Sauer (2014).
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225f. Goenner, 2004, 61f.). During those same months, Reich-
enbach, despite the support of Max Planck, was struggling to
obtain his Umhabilitation4 from Stuttgart to Berlin in order to be
appointed to a chair of natural philosophy that had been created
there (Hecht & Hoffmann, 1982). On March 16, 1926, Reichenbach
sent a letter to Einstein in which, after discussing his academic
misadventures, he remarked on the new ‘metric-affine’ theory
(Einstein, 1925b):
“I have read your last work on the extended Rel. Th5 more
closely, but I still can't get rid of a sense of artificiality which
characterizes all these attempts since Weyl. The idea, in itself
very deep, to ground the affine connection independently of
the metric on the Γikl alone, serves only as a calculation crutch
here in order to obtain differential equations for the gik and the
φik and the modifications of the Maxwell equations which
allow the electron as a solution. If it worked, it would of course
be a great success; have you achieved something along these
lines with Grommer? However, the whole thing does not have
the beautiful convincing power [Ueberzeugungskraft] of the
connection between gravitation and the metric based on the
equivalence principle of the previous theory” (Reichenbach to
Einstein, March 16, 1926; AEA, 20–83).
Reichenbach expressed skepticism early on towards Weyl's theory
(Reichenbach, 1920, 73). Even if he partly retracted some of his
concerns (Reichenbach, 1922, 367–368), he still felt that the theory
did not have the same ‘convincing power’ (Uberzeugungskraft) of
general relativity (Reichenbach, 1922, 367), in which the identifi-
cation of the gik with the gravitational potentials was solidly
anchored in the principle of equivalence.63 Einstein (1927a) was finished in January 1926. Einstein insists there that he
had returned to the trace-free field equations as “a consequence of numerous
failures” to pursue the “the approach proposed by Weyl and Eddington or some-
thing analogous” (Einstein, 1927a, 100). Einstein also derived the trace-free field
equations using an approach suggested by Rainich (1925). In Rainich's view, in the
case where the whole non-gravitational energy is electromagnetic, Einstein's field
equations are already unified with Maxwell equations in empty space, because of
certain algebraic property of the Riemann tensor (cf. Einstein to Rainich, December
8, 1925; AEA, 20-003 and Einstein to Rainich, March 8 1926; AEA, 79-686). This
‘already unified field theory’ will play an important role in the history of ‘geome-
trization’ program of physics when it was rediscovered by Charles Misner and
Archibald Wheeler in the late fifties (Misner & Wheeler, 1957); see also below on
Footnote 43.
4 The process of obtaining the venia legendi at another university.
5 Einstein (1925b).
6 Reichenbach already expressed reservations about Weyl's approach in his
1920 monograph on relativity, in which he accused Weyl of attempting to deduce
physics from geometry (Reichenbach, 1920, 73). In early 1921, Weyl explained to
Reichenbach in private correspondence that his theory was less ambitious: “I have
claimed only that the concepts in geometry and field physics have come to coin-
cide” (Weyl to Reichenbach, February 1921; HR, 015-68-04; tr. Rynasiewicz, 2005,
153, note 17). Briefly thereafter Weyl replied publicly to Reichenbach (Weyl, 1921,
475), who retracted his criticisms (Reichenbach, 1922, 367–368). However, Reich-
enbach still expressed concerns about the formalistic nature of the ‘second version’
of the theory. In order to circumvent Einstein's objection (1918) that the theory was
contradicted by the actual behavior of atomic clocks, Weyl (1920) abandoned the
interpretation of the ‘ideal’ process of length-transfer in terms of the ‘real’ behavior
of rods and clocks. According to Reichenbach, in this way the theory loses its
“convincing character” and becomes “dangerously close to a mathematical form-
alism” (Reichenbach, 1922, 367); Reichenbach's wording is very similar to that of
Pauli (1921, 763). Weyl's identification of the four-vector φν with the electro-
magnetic four-potential appears to only be motivated by the goal of constructing a
suitable ‘action’ from which he hoped to recover “the natural forms of the most
general physical equations” via the ‘action principle’ (‘Wirkungsprinzip’) (Reich-
enbach, 1922, 367), that is, by requiring that the action-quantity assumes a sta-
tionary value. Moreover, Reichenbach criticizes Weyl's appeal to the epistemolo-
gical superiority of his ‘purely infinitesimal geometry’, by referring to the work of
Eddington (1921) and Schouten (1922b): Weyl's geometry is only a special case of
Eddington's, which in turn is only a special case of Schouten's general linear con-
nection (Reichenbach, 1922, 367).Perhaps it is not a coincidence that Reichenbach uses the very
same turn of phrase in this letter. Einstein's theory introduces the
affine connection independent of the metric. However, it does not
attribute any physical meaning to the former; the separate varia-
tion of the metric and connection was nothing more than a ‘cal-
culation device’ to find the desired field equations. Reichenbach,
however, was ready to revise his negative judgment if Einstein's
theory delivered the ‘electron’. At the end of the paper (Einstein,
1925b), Einstein had in fact claimed that he was working with his
assistant Jakob Grommer on the problem of establishing whether
the theory allows for “the existence of singularity-free, centrally
symmetric electric masses” (Einstein, 1925b, 419). For Einstein this
was a fundamental criterion for the viability of a unified field
theory (cf. e.g., Einstein, 1923a).
On March 20, 1926 Einstein replied that he warm-heartedly
agreed with Reichenbach's ‘Γ-Kritik’: “I have absolutely lost hope
of going any further using these formal ways”; “without some real
new thought,” he continued, “it simply does not work” (Einstein to
Reichenbach, March 20, 1926; AEA, 20-115). Einstein's reaction
reflects his disillusion with the attempts to achieve the sought-for
unification of gravitational and electromagnetic field via some
generalization of Riemannian geometry. He would have probably
been less ready to embrace Reichenbach's critique if he had known
what the latter exactly had in mind (see next section). However,
Reichenbach was of course pleased by Einstein's endorsement. On
March 31, 1926 he revealed that his remarks were not extempor-
ary, but were the fruit of a more thorough consideration of the
topic that he had jotted down at the time:
“I'm of course very glad that you agree with my Γ-critique. I
have now made a few reflections on the topic, which seem to
me to prove that the Weylean thought, although good mathe-
matically, does not bring about anything new physically. The
geometrical interpretation of electricity is only a visualization,
which in itself still does not say anything, and can also be
realized in the original relativity theory. I have attached the
note and would be grateful if you could give it a look” (Reich-
enbach to Einstein, March 24, 26; AEA, 20-085).
Reichenbach attached to this letter a typewritten note. As we shall
see, far more was at stake in it than a critique of Weyl's theory
(which was generally considered a dead horse at the time).
Reichenbach intended to call into question the very idea that, since
general relativity has ‘geometrized’ the gravitational field, the
obvious next move should be to try to ‘geometrize’ the
electromagnetic field.3. Intermezzo: Reichenbach's note
In the following I will present the content of Reichenbach's
note, operating under the assumption that it corresponds to a part
of a ten-page typescript bearing the title “Zur einheitlichen Feld-
theorie von Gravitation und Elektrizität” (‘On the unified field
theory of gravitation and electricity’). The document is preserved
at the Reichenbach Archives in Pittsburgh (HR, 025-05-10).7 On
the basis of the correspondence with Einstein that ensued (see
next section) and of Reichenbach's handwritten corrections to the
text, I conjecture that only pp. 1–7, that is, parts I and II of the
typescript, were sent to Einstein; the bottom of p. 7 was probably
added later and then included in a new part III,8 which extended
through pp. 8–10. Even though, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I
will not painstakingly follow the order of Reichenbach's7 HR, 025-05-11 is a copy of the last four pages of HR, 025-05-10.
8 See also below in Section 5.2 for more details on this hypothesis.
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in turn seems to closely follow the German translation (Eddington,
1925a) of Eddington's textbook on relativity (Eddington, 1923).
3.1. The physical realization of the operation of displacement
Reichenbach attributes to Weyl the merit of having defined the
operation of displacement (or parallel transport of vectors) given
by the Γτμν independent of the metric gμν. Reichenbach considered
this result a “milestone” (HR, 025-05-10, 2) in the history of the
mathematical problem of space. However, in Reichenbach's view,
Weyl's “physical interpretation was not so fortunate” (HR, 025-05-
10, 2). To explain the limits of Weyl's approach, Reichenbach refers
to his distinction between Einstellung (adjustment)—the behavior
of the physical systems that realize the comparison of length
defined by gμν—and Beharrung (preservation)— the behavior of
physical systems that correspond to the operation of the com-
parison of direction defined by the Γτμν.
9 Whereas the systems of
the first type really exist in nature (i.e., rods and clocks), in Weyl's
theory there are no such systems corresponding to the operation
of displacement. Thus, according to Reichenbach, the separation of
the operation of displacement from the metric is nothing but a
“calculation aid” (HR, 025-05-10, 3) for finding the correct field
equations. Reichenbach immediately extends the objection to
Eddington's theory (Eddington, 1921) and to Einstein's version of
the latter (Einstein, 1923e, 1923f, 1925a), which radicalized Weyl's
fundamental separation of metric and displacement.
As we have just seen, this is precisely the Γ-critique, which
Einstein—who had already abandoned this operationalist point of
view (Giovanelli, 2014)—had too hastily endorsed in the corre-
spondence with Reichenbach. In fact Reichenbach intended to
show that in the “original general relativity” (HR, 025-05-10, 3)—
that is, in the Maxwell–Einstein theory describing gravity together
with electromagnetism—it is already possible to find a realization
for both fundamental operations, the metric and displacement,
and thus to present the gravitational and electromagnetic fields in
a common geometrical setting. In this way, the Maxwell–Einstein
theory can be reformulated in a geometrical form “without any
change to its physical content” (HR, 025-05-10, 1). This also means
that the opposite is true: “In itself, this geometrical framework
does not bring any physical innovation” (HR, 025-05-10, 1).
The gμν are already identified with the gravitational potentials,
and measured with rods and clocks. Thus, in order to ‘geometrize’
the electromagnetic field, Reichenbach has to rely on the operation
of displacement Γτμν, and select suitable indicators for it. Physical
theories provide no help in this respect, and thus Reichenbach
tentatively searched among the physical phenomena that react to
both the gravitational and electromagnetic fields, and at the same
time happen to behave in the sense of the displacement Γτμν.
Gravitational and electromagnetic forces together determine the
motion of particles. Thus a natural choice, though still arbitrary
one, was to choose the motion of electrically charged mass points
as indicators of the displacement-field. In general relativity, the
motion of such particles is subject to the already-known equations9 Weyl (1920) introduced the distinction between Einstellung and Beharrung to
explain away the discrepancy between the non-Riemannian behavior of the ‘ideal’
time-like vectors implied by his theory and the Riemannian behavior of the ‘real’
clocks that are actually observed (Einstein's measuring rods objection, Einstein,
1918). He suggested that atomic clocks might not preserve their Bohr radius if
transported, but adjust it every time to some constant field quantity. See Ryckman
(2005, Sections 4.2.4; 6.4.2.2) for more details. Reichenbach (1922) complained that
this sounds more like a restatement of the problem than a solution to it. Moreover,
the adaptation has nothing to do with the parallel transport of vectors, so the latter
remains physically empty (Reichenbach, 1922, 368, n. 1). However, Reichenbach
made ‘metaphorical’ use of Weyl's ‘Einstellung’ in Reichenbach (1924, 71), and
again in Reichenbach (1925, 47). See also below Footnote 37.of the motion of charged particles of mass 1, which is therefore the
starting point of Reichenbach's investigation:
duτ
ds
¼Γτμνuμuν f τνiν where Γτμν ¼ 
μν
τ
 
ðiÞ
On the left-hand side of the equation is the acceleration of a
particle, the rate of change of its velocity four-vector uν ¼ dxν=ds
(where xν is the four-position of a particle) with respect to a
parameter s, identified with the particle's proper time. On the
right-hand side the geodesic equation is supplemented by the
term  f τνiν responsible for the effect of the electromagnetic field
on charged particles. Notice that mass m does not appear in the
force term, and thus the equation is valid only for unit masses. As
is well known, this equation states that uncharged bodies free
falling in a gravitational field follow geodesic paths, that is, lines of
extremal length in a generally curved Riemannian space–time
(particle four-acceleration vanishes identically and free-falling
motion is indistinguishable from inertial motion). Charged bod-
ies deviate from geodesic paths under the influence of an elec-
tromagnetic field, according to the Lorentz force law Kτ ¼  f τνiν.
The gμτf
τ
ν ¼ fμν are the electromagnetic field strengths and iν ¼ ρuν
is the four-current, where ρ is the charge density and uν is the
four-velocity.10
Reichenbach aimed to rewrite these equations of motion so
that charged particles under the influence of an electromagnetic
field follow their ‘natural path’ defined by the displacement. To
this end he stipulates that the physical behavior of mass points
provides the ‘physical realization’ (or ‘coordinative definition’) of
the geometrical operation of parallel displacement of their velocity
four-vector uτ. In general relativity, when an uncharged particle
moves freely, its velocity-vector is carried by parallel displacement
along a geodesic line in Riemannian space. One can imagine a
more comprehensive geometrical framework in which the dis-
placement of the velocity four-vector of a charged body along its
own direction also defines a ‘privileged’ path. For this reason one
has to find a suitable geometrical setting.
The square of the length l of the velocity four-vector is per
definition equal to c2, and can be calculated from its components
uν according to the formula:
l2 ¼ gμνuμuν ¼ 1 ðby a suitable choice of unitsÞ ðiiÞ
Because the length of the velocity four-vector is fixed (up to a
constant), this imposes constraints on the geometrical setting one
can use (HR, 025-05-10, 9)11:
 The length of this velocity l vector must remain unchanged
under parallel transport, that is, dðl2Þ ¼ 0. This imposes a
restriction on the ‘displacement space’ Γτμν. It can be shown that
such a condition is satisfied if a tensor of third order Kμν;σ ¼ 0,
where Kμν;σ12 is defined as follows (cf. Eddington, 1921, 109):
2Kμν;σ ¼
gνσ
xμ
Γμν;σΓμσ;ν
One thus obtains a ‘metrical space’, that is, in Reichenbach's
parlance, a space where the comparison of lengths at distance is
path-independent. Weyl space differs from such a metrical
space because Kμν;σ ¼ gμνκσ (Weyl famously identified κσ with
the electromagnetic four-potential).13 In a metrical space, it is10 The mixed-variant form f τν of the electromagnetic tensor f μν appears
because of the contra-variant four-velocity uν in the definition of the four-current iν
(cf. Eddington, 1925a, 273).
11 See the cross-out paragraph on p. 5, which was later moved to pp. 8–9 in the
longer version of the Note
12 The so-called non-metricity tensor.
13 cf. Footnote 2.
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general, they are not identical with the straightest lines, defined
by auto-parallel displacing of vectors.
 To assure that the straightest lines coincide with the shortest
lines, one has to impose a further condition, that the connection
Γτμν is symmetric in the lower indices μ and ν, that is:
Γτμν ¼ 
μν
τ
 
ðiiiÞ
where the three-index symbol on the right-hand side is the
negative of the Christoffel symbols of the second kind. This
specialization leads to the so-called ‘Riemannian space’, in
which there are therefore geodesics; i.e., lines that are straight-
est and shortest at the same time.14
If one does not require the connection to be symmetric (by
simply permuting the lower indices, one obtains a different con-
nection; Schouten, 1922a, 1922b),15 then one can work in a
metrical space that is not identical to the Riemannian space. In this
space the straightest lines are not identical to the shortest ones.16
Reichenbach intends to exploit this additional ‘degree of freedom’
to define an operation of displacement that expresses the effect of
both the gravitational and electromagnetic fields. Charged mass
points of unit mass move (or their velocity four-vector is parallel-
transported) along the straightest lines, and uncharged particles
move on the straightest lines that are at the same time the
shortest ones (or rather, the line of extremal length). Let's see how
Reichenbach proceeded in more detail.3.2. An outline of Reichenbach's theory
Reichenbach's presentation (see HR, 025-05-10, 3–4) can be
summarized in three stages:
1. Mimicking Eddington's (1921) theory (cf. Section 2), Reich-
enbach introduced the fundamental tensor Gμν which combines
the electrical and gravitational fields:
Gμν ¼ gμνþ f μν ðivÞ
According to the usual procedure, this tensor can be decom-
posed into a symmetric part gμν and an anti-symmetric part f μν
which, as one might expect, can be identified with gravitational/
metrical field and the electromagnetic field:
gμν ¼ 1=2ðGμνþGνμÞ f μν ¼ 1=2ðGμνGνμÞ ðvÞ
The metric can be defined ds2 ¼ Gμν dxμ dxν ¼ gμν dxμ dxν, which
is measured by using rods and clocks in absence of the
electromagnetic field (f μν ¼ 0), that is, the more nearly the Gμν
approximate to gμν. Thus, rods and clocks are not indicators of
the f μν and a suitable indicator will be introduced later.
 The gμν are governed by Einstein's field equations rμν12 gμν
r¼ κTμν where r is written in lowercase to indicate that it
depends on the first and second derivatives of the gμν alone
(not on the whole Gμν).
 The f μν are governed by the Maxwell equations, which in
four-tensor notation can be written: ∂f μν∂xρ þ
∂f νρ
∂xμ þ
∂f ρμ
∂xν ¼ 0 and∂f σρ
∂xρ ¼ i
σ .14 Reichenbach restricts the use of the term ‘geodesic’ to Riemannian
geodesics.
15 The asymmetry tensor Sμν;τ ¼ 12 Γ
τ
μνΓτνμa0. The term ‘torsion’ had been
introduced already by Cartan (1922) but it was still not in usage.
16 Cf. Misner, Thorne, & Wheeler (1973, 248–251) for an intuitive explanation.2. A displacement Γτμν is introduced and decomposed into two
parts (cf. Schouten, 1924, 851):
Γτμν ¼ γτμνþφτμν ðviÞ
γτμν ¼ 
μν
τ
 
φτμν ¼ gμσ f τν
∂f σρ
∂xρ
ðviiÞ
 The first γτμν are defined as the negative of the Christoffel
symbols of the second kind, which are functions of the gμν
and their first-order partial derivatives.
 The definition of the φτμν (which Reichenbach does not
explain further) seems to be obtained from the right side of
four-dimensional Lorentz force law Kτ ¼  f τνiν, in which
Maxwell equations with sources (∂f
σρ
∂xρ ¼ i
σ) substitute the
four-current. The term gμσ is added to lower the indices
gμσ i
σ ¼ iμ. The direct product of two tensors (multiplying
components from the two tensors together, pair by pair)
increases the rank of the tensor by the sum of the ranks of
each tensor,17 keeping the character of the indices. Thus
Reichenbach obtains φτμν ¼  f τνiμ, that is, a skew-symmetric
three-rank tensor with two lower the indices.
Without pointing it out explicitly, Reichenbach exploits the fact
that the difference of two displacements transforms like a mixed
tensor of third rank (Eddington, 1921, 109; Eq. 4.6). In particular a
non-symmetric displacement is always the sum of a symmetric
displacement and a skew symmetric tensor. Thus, Reichenbach
seems to have obtained the hoped-for result in a formally correct
way: Γτμν is the sum of the usual Christoffel symbols, which in
turn depend on the gravitational field gμν, and a tensorial part,
which depends on the electromagnetic field f μν.
3. The reason for the definitions (vii) immediately becomes
apparent (HR, 025-05-10, 6–7). Using (vii), Reichenbach can
rewrite (i) so that the force term is, so to speak, absorbed into a
suitably defined Γτμν:
duτ
ds
¼Γτμνuμuν ðviiiÞ
According to (vi), this equation is equivalent to the following:
duτ
ds
¼ γτμνuμuνþφτμνuμuν ðixÞ
Because of (vii), the three-index symbol γτμν is defined as the
Christoffel symbols of the second kind; thus the first summand
of (ix) is simply the right-hand side of the general relativistic
geodesic equation. To see the trick behind Reichenbach's less
than obvious definition of the tensor φτμν, a little more effort is
needed. Plugging this definition into Eq. (ix), the second
summand becomes gμσ f τν∂f
σρ
∂xρ u
μuν. Keeping in mind Maxwell's
equations with sources (where iσ ¼ ρuσ), one obtains
gμσ f τνρuσuμuν. According to (ii), gμσuμuσ ¼ 1, thus the expres-
sion reduces to  f τνρuν ¼  f τνiν. The final result is the following:
duτ
ds
¼  μν
τ
 
uμuν f τνiν ðxÞ
This is of course nothing but Eq. (i), from which we started. By
defining the displacement space Γτμν in a suitable way (via (vi)
and (vii)), Reichenbach was able to dress this well-known
equation's physical content in the more appealing geometrical
garb of Eq. (viii).
Just like Eq. (i) in general relativity, Eq. (viii) in Reichenbach's
theory describes the motion of test particles under the influence of17 A vector is of course a tensor of first rank.
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now the difference in the behavior of charged and uncharged
particles can be expressed in terms of geometrical differences
within Reichenbach's non-Riemannian space–time. The velocity-
vectors of charged particles of unit mass are parallel transported
along the straightest lines defined by Γτμν. When the charge of
these particles is zero (i.e., when the tensorial component of φτμν
vanishes) the straightest lines coincide with the shortest one.
In this way Reichenbach believed himself to have achieved the
sought-for geometrization of the Einstein–Maxwell theory. Grav-
itation gμν and the electromagnetic field f μν are components of the
geometrical field Gμν. Physically, the metric gμν is defined via the
behavior of rods and clocks in which the gravitational field man-
ifests itself. The displacement space Γτμν, which has been defined
as a function of gμν and f μν, finds its physical counterparts in the
velocity vectors of particles of unit mass and arbitrary charge,
which are indicators of the electromagnetic field.4. Einstein's comments on Reichenbach's note
Einstein must have immediately read or at least glanced at
Reichenbach's attempt at providing a unified field theory, and he
replied a few days later on March 31, 1926. His initial reaction to
the theory was not very encouraging:
“You've run over to the theoretical physicists and moreover at a
bad spot. Of course I immediately found some flies in the oint-
ment. First of all, your approach φτμν ¼ gμσ f τν∂f
σρ
∂xρ is really arbi-
trary. Second, no metric should belong to your Γτμν. It is unna-
tural to ascribe a metric to the summand γ of Γ. Your equations
of motion do not have any physical meaning, since they describe
the behavior of matter only for a value of the relationships
between electrical and ponderable density. Finally, your theory
does not connect electricity and gravitation, since there are no
mathematically unified field equations that provide the field law
for gravitation and electromagnetism simultaneously; it does not
even provide a connection between electricity and gravitation in
the sense that one could infer from the theory which electro-
magnetic quantities produce the gravitational field. I would not
publish it; otherwise, what happened to me will happen to you:
you'll have to disown your children” (Einstein to Reichenbach,
March 31, 1926; AEA, 20-116).
Einstein deconstructs Reichenbach's theory piece by piece. (1) The
definition (vii) of the φτμν does not seem to have any physical
motivation. (2) A Riemannian metric determines an affine con-
nection; however, in general this is not true the other way around
(cf. e.g., Einstein, 1923c, 9). If Reichenbach started from a general
displacement space Γτμν and defined it via parallel transport
independently from the metric gμν, then he should not have
reintroduced the gμν surreptitiously by defining the γτμν as the
negative of the Christoffel symbols of the second kind (which are
expressed in terms of the gμν) (see Eq. (iii))
18 (3) Reichenbach's
equations of motion can be valid only for a certain charge-density-
to-mass-density ratio ρ=μ (or, in the case of particles, a certain
charge-to-mass ratio e=m). In a given displacement, there is only
one straightest line passing through a point in a given direction,
but different test particles with different charge-to-mass ratios18 Einstein's insistence on this point probably should be understood against the
background of his own recent attempts at a unified field theory. In his reformu-
lation of Eddington's theory, Einstein, in contrast to Eddington, constructed a
Lagrangian density H depending only on a connection and its first derivatives, and
considered the variation δfR H¼ 0g only with respect to the connection (Einstein,
1923e, 34). As we have seen, in his last theory he assumed that the variation of the
affine connection and the metric are independent of one another (Einstein, 1925b).accelerate differently in the same electric field. Thus they cannot
all travel on the same straightest line (see below in Section 5.2).
After all, this is the precise difference between gravitational and
non-gravitational forces. Finally, (4) in the note, the gμν and f μν are
governed respectively by the well-known Einstein and Maxwell
equations; thus the theory not only fails to yield a single set of
field equations governing both the gravitational and electromag-
netic fields, but it does not even bother to supplement the
gravitational field equations with electromagnetic terms so that
they contain the gravitational effect of the electromagnetic field.
That is, the theory does not even yield a geometrization of the
Einstein–Maxwell theory.
Reichenbach replied by return post on April 4, 1926. There are
two aspects to his response, which we will deal with separately for
the sake of clarity. First, Reichenbach replied to Einstein's technical
objections:
“(1) The approach for the φτμν is not only arbitrary (willkürlich),
but even artificial (künstlich); but why is one not allowed [to do
something like this]? Here, from a purely logical point of view,
one can define what one wants; one can define the [φτμν] in
such a way that [the definition] agrees with already known law
of motion of charged particles (2) you say that no metric should
pertain to my Γτμν; however, it is exactly the opposite.
Eddington assumes the field Γτμν as primary and deduces from
it the field Gμν, which he splits into a symmetrical and anti-
symmetrical part. One can also assume a field Gμν as primary
and derive from it a field Γτμν; this is logically equivalent (3) My
law of motion is not valid only for a certain ratio of charge and
mass, but for arbitrary charge and mass¼1. However from the
point of view of the geometrical visualization this disadvantage
is no worse than the fact that not every measuring rod defines
the ds, but only the one of length 1” (Reichenbach to Einstein,
April 4, 1926; AEA, 20-086)
Concerning (1), the awkward definition of one of the summands
of the φτμν in Eq. (vii), Reichenbach did not hide that his theory was
an operation of ‘reverse engineering’; and for this reason anything
goes, even a cheap trick like the one he used in the note. Objection
(2), for Reichenbach, was the consequence of Einstein's hasty
reading. Reichenbach did not start from the displacement and
then define the tensor Gμν in terms of the latter, as Eddington did,
but the other way around. Thus the metric was not obtained as a
by-product, but was introduced from the beginning. To make his
point, Reichenbach explains to Einstein the geometrical structure
he resorted to, a metrical space, in which the symmetry of the
lower indices of the Γτμν is dropped. In Riemannian space the
operation of displacement delivers the same comparison of length
as the metric. From this the “Riemannian values μντ
 
of the Γτμν”
follow, if one assumes that the latter are symmetric in the lower
indexes μ and ν. If one drops this assumption, then “one has at
one's disposal a somewhat more general Γτμν” (Reichenbach to
Einstein, April 4, 1926; AEA, 20-086). One can then define the
operation of displacement so that charged mass-points move on
auto-parallel lines, which in general do not coincide with lines of
extremal length: “in this way one obtains a full geometrical
visualization of the law of motion” (Reichenbach to Einstein, April
4, 1926; AEA, 20-086).19 Thus Reichenbach also makes it clear that
he was not concerned with finding the field equations, as Einstein19 As Dennis Lehmkuhl pointed out to me, it is curious that neither Reich-
enbach nor Einstein ever mention Theodor Kaluza's theory, in which (under certain
conditions) such a geometric visualization seems to have been already achieved:
both charged and uncharged particles move on geodesics of R5 (Kaluza, 1921, 970).
Einstein (possibly influenced by Klein, 1926) showed renewed interest in the theory
in the following months (Einstein, 1927b, 1927c). Dennis is working on a paper on
this topic.
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equations of motion geometrically. Replying to objection (3) Reich-
enbach insists that these equations are valid for the motion of a
body with unit mass and arbitrary charge. If one rewrites the
tensorial part of the displacement as φτμν ¼ ρf τνuμ, one sees that
the charge density ρ (but not the mass density μ) appears as a
parameter. Setting μ¼1, Reichenbach argues, is no worse than
setting ds¼1.20 So Reichenbach seems to have interpreted Ein-
stein's objection as a misunderstanding. However, the validity of
Reichenbach's equations of motion for arbitrary charge might have
been precisely the severe flaw that Einstein envisaged in his
approach, as Reichenbach himself possibly realized later (see
below Sections 5.1 and 5.2).21
The second aspect of Reichenbach's defense is even more
important for properly understanding his philosophical goals.
Einstein misunderstood the spirit of the typescript. Reichenbach
makes clear that the physicists should in no way think that he had
some “secret physical intention” (Reichenbach to Einstein, April 4,
1926; AEA, 20-086). Thus, Reichenbach recounted to Einstein why
he decided to write the note. He was working on a philosophical
presentation of the problem of space (see below in Section 5.2),
and of course he felt compelled to add a chapter about ‘Weyl
space’, or more generally about attempts to ‘geometrize’ the
electromagnetic field by using some generalization of Riemannian
geometry: “Thereby I wondered what the geometrical presenta-
tion of electricity actually means” (Reichenbach to Einstein, April
4, 1926; AEA, 20-086).
Reichenbach concluded that such alleged geometrizations were
actually only ‘graphical representations’ (graphische Darstellungen)
—an expression he clearly borrowed from Eddington (1925a,
294ff.).22 They were comparable to the account of the “Lorentz
transformations as rotations in Minkowski space” (Reichenbach to
Einstein, April 4, 1926; AEA, 20-086), which is only a formal ana-
logy. To prove his point, Reichenbach decided to construct an
Abbildung or mapping of the Einstein–Maxwell theory onto a non-
Riemannian space, “without any change of its physical content”
(Reichenbach to Einstein, April 4, 1926; AEA, 20-086; my
emphasis).
Reichenbach was even more ambitious. He aimed to present a
geometrical transcription (Umschreibung) that was in some
respects better than the one provided by Weyl and his successors,
including Einstein. Reichenbach's geometrical interpretation, he
insisted, had “the advantage over other geometrical representa-
tions in that the operation of displacement possesses a physical
realization [Realisierung]” (Reichenbach to Einstein, April 4, 1926;
AEA, 20-086; my emphasis), namely, the velocity-vector of
charged mass particles of unit mass. In Eddington's parlance23 it is
a ‘natural geometry’.
This point is essential to Reichenbach's argument. It was pre-
cisely because his toy-geometrization was not envied by its more
titled competitors that Reichenbach believed himself to be in an
excellent position to “attack the view that with a geometrical
presentation of electricity, one would already gain something”
(Reichenbach to Einstein, April 4, 1926; AEA, 20-086). For such a
geometrical interpretation of electromagnetism to become a20 See below Footnote 35.
21 I thank Dennis Lehmkuhl for a discussion on this point.
22 For Reichenbach's use of this term see below Footnote Section 5.2. For
Eddington, ‘graphical representations’ are geometrical visualizations of physical
quantities, e.g., pressure–volume diagrams of an ideal gas, which, however, do not
make any hypothesis as to the ultimate nature of the quantities represented. In
Eddington's view, Weyl's non-Riemannian geometry is not the real geometry of
space–time as Weyl claimed, but merely a ‘graphical representation’. The ‘natural
geometry’ is the geometry of rods and clocks, which is exactly Riemannian
(Eddington, 1925a, 296).
23 See previous footnote.physical theory as successful as general relativity, more was
required than a mere geometrization. It called for something new:
“If one succeeds in establishing unified field equations that
admit the electron as a solution, this would be something new.
To this end one should do something more than establish a
simple formal pooling [Zusammenfassung] of the Maxwell eq.
and the gravitational equations; these eq. should be changed in
their content. This is the problem on which you are working
and of course also what Weyl and Eddington meant. But the
geometrical representation of electricity in itself does not lead to
this goal. It can at most be an aid [Hilfsmittel] to guessing the
right equations; maybe what looks most simple from the
standpoint of Weyl geometry, also happens to be correct. But
this would be only a coincidence. […] Inasmuch, however, as
the present theories do not provide the electron as a solution,
they also provide nothing more than a simple transcription
[Umschreibung] of the old Th. of Rel” (Reichenbach to Einstein,
April 4, 1926; AEA, 20-086; my emphasis).
Thus, Reichenbach argued that the geometrical interpretation of a
physical field can only be successful if it leads to a ‘change’ in the
equations and does not simply rewrite in geometrical terms the
equations that are already known. One could object that Weyl,
Eddington and Einstein's theories also changed the equations and
did not simply rewrite them. However, Reichenbach seems to
consider the derivability of solutions that correspond to the elec-
tron as a litmus test for a real change in the field equations.
Maxwell's field equations are valid in free space and cannot
explain why the separate, equally charged parts do not fly apart
without introducing a non-electromagnetic cohesion force (the so-
called Poincaré stress). On the other hand, Einstein's field equa-
tions, in their original form, do not entail any effect of gravitation
on charge and cannot provide the cohesion force. It is only by
changing the currently available field equations that it would
become possible to establish a connection between gμν and f μν,
thereby assuring the equilibrium of the electron.
To fully understand Reichenbach's stance on this issue, one
must keep in mind that in a paper published in April (Reich-
enbach, 1926b) he expressed strong skepticism about the possi-
bility of solving the problem of the ‘grainy’ structure of matter and
most all of the “proper quantum-riddle” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 424)
in a field-theoretical/geometrical context. In Reichenbach's view,
the “casuality [Zufälligkeit]” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 424) of the
‘quantum jumps’ (the transition between orbital energy levels in
Bohr's atom) suggests that the problem should be tackled from a
different angle, by considering whether the very notion of caus-
ality in physics should be replaced by that of probability
(Reichenbach, 1926b, 424). After all, one should appreciate
Reichenbach's clairvoyance, considering that Max Born's paper
(Born, 1926) on the statistical interpretation of the wave function
appeared only in June.24
Reichenbach offered to send Einstein the corresponding epis-
temological sections of the text onwhich he was working (possibly
Section 50 of the Appendix). In a letter from April 8, 1926 Einstein
did not comment on this offer, but his reaction to Reichenbach
took a different tone. Even if Einstein did not reply to Reich-
enbach's more technical remarks, Reichenbach's philosophical
point clearly resonated with him:
“You are completely right. It is incorrect to believe that ‘geo-
metrization’ means something essential. It is instead a mne-
monic device [Eselsbrücke] to find numerical laws. If one24 For Reichenbach's take on the emerging quantum mechanics at this time,
see the posthumously published manuscript, Reichenbach (1926a).
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theory, it is an inessential, private issue. What is essential in
Weyl is that he subjected the formulas, beyond the invariance
with respect to [coordinate] transformation, to a new condition
(‘gauge invariance’).25 However, this advantage is neutralized
again, since one has to go to equations of the 4. order,26 which
means a significant increase of arbitrariness” (Reichenbach to
Einstein, April 8, 1926; AEA, 20-117).
Recently the importance of this letter has been emphasized in
Einstein scholarship (Lehmkuhl, 2014). It is the first instance
where Einstein explicitly claims that general relativity did not
geometrize gravitation, thus suggesting a very different interpre-
tation of the achievement of the theory than what we are used to.
The geometrization was only a means to the end of finding the
field equations, which are ‘numerical laws’. It is worth noticing
that Einstein goes further in claiming that even Weyl's theory
should not be seen as an attempt to ‘geometrize’ the electromag-
netic field. The core of Weyl's theory consists in the formal
requirement of ‘gauge invariance’, which, however, led to equa-
tions where the choice of the Lagrangian becomes non-unique. For
our purposes it is interesting that Einstein not only endorsed
Reichenbach's claim that a ‘geometrization’ is not an essential
achievement of general relativity, but also questioned the meaning
of the notion of ‘geometrization’, and for that matter the very
notion of ‘geometry’ (Lehmkuhl, 2014). This latter step was not
taken by Reichenbach, who preferred to speak of general relativity
as a ‘geometrical interpretation of the gravitational field’, albeit
not a ‘geometrization’ of the latter.5. From the unpublished note to the Appendix of Philosophie
der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
5.1. The Stuttgart talk
Reassured by Einstein's endorsement, in the ensuing weeks
Reichenbach must have continued to work on the note. Correc-
tions made by hand suggest that he probably added some remarks
at the bottom of p. 7 which later were included in an entirely new
part III that extended through pp. 8–10. Reichenbach apparently
believed himself to have refuted most of Einstein's objections,
since no corrections were made to the first two parts of the note.
However, he may have realized that the claim in his theory that
unit mass particles of arbitrary charge travel on the privileged
paths of Γτμν was less straightforward than he initially thought.
Reichenbach now acknowledged that this point “requires a further
clarification” (HR, 025-05-10, 7).27
As we have seen, Reichenbach had defined the Γτμν as the sum
of the Christoffel symbols γτμν and the tensorial correction φ
τ
μν,
which depends on the divergence of the electromagnetic field
strengths ∂f ρσ∂xρ (see Def. (vii)). Reichenbach explains that in a region
of space–time free of charge, where ∂f ρσ∂xρ vanishes, the tensorial
component of the connection vanishes as well φτμν ¼ 0. The dis-
placement becomes identical to the Riemannian displacement25 That is, invariance by the substitution of gik with λgik where λ is an arbitrary
smooth function of position (cf. Weyl, 1918b, 468). Weyl introduced the expression
‘gauge invariance’ (Eichinvarianz) in Weyl (1919a, 114).
26 Cf. Weyl (1918b, 477). Einstein regarded this as one of the major short-
comings of Weyl's theory; see Einstein to Besso, August 20, 1918; CPAE, Vol. 8b, Doc.
604, Einstein to Hilbert, June 9, 1919; CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 58.
27 This reconstruction is merely conjectural. This ‘further clarification’ is
strangely never mentioned in the correspondence with Einstein. Thus I surmise
that Reichenbach added it when he realized that his claim that charge particles of
arbitrary charge all travel on privileged paths was problematic as Einstein had
pointed out.Γτμν ¼ γτμν; the parallel transport of the velocity-vector of
uncharged mass points describes a geodesic, a line that is the
shortest and straightest at the same time. If the divergence ∂f ρσ∂xρ for
the entire electrical field a0 (that is ¼ iν), then the tensorial
contribution φτμν to the connection appears; and with it Reich-
enbach's non-Riemannian Γτμν; the velocity-vector of charged unit
mass points is parallel transported along the straightest lines,
whereas uncharged mass points move along the shortest lines
(HR, 025-05-10, 7).
Reichenbach must have found it somewhat unsatisfying that
the Γτμνfield depends not only on the electromagnetic field, but
also on the charge of the test particles. At the bottom of p. 7 he
squeezed in a footnote reassuring his readers that this “is not
something like a blemish but an essential trait” (HR, 025-05-10, 7;
footnote) of every theory attempting to ‘geometrize’ the effect of
the electromagnetic field on its probes28: “[a] charged mass point
produces […] its own transfer geometry [Verpflanzungsgeometrie]
depending on the strength of its charge” (HR, 025-05-10, 7–8).
It was probably at a later stage that Reichenbach decided to
transform these additional remarks into a new part III of the note.
A loose leaf with the handwritten indication Einlage zu S. 7
(insertion to p. 7) contains a few introductory lines that were
supposed to be inserted before the passages just mentioned. The
reassuring footnote at the bottom of p. 7 was crossed-out and its
content moved into the main text. In the subsequent lines,
Reichenbach added some further remarks to persuade those who
still may have been perplexed. There is ultimately nothing wrong
in assuming that, in addition to the ‘space-field’ (Raumfeld) f μν (the
geometrized electromagnetic field as the second components of
Gμν), the presence of a charged test particle produces ‘an extra-
field’ Γτμν (Zusatzfeld) which, via the tensorial term φ
τ
μν ¼  f τμiν,
also depends on ρ.29 However, beneath his self-assured facade,
Reichenbach might have sensed that the status of this extra dis-
placement field was rather unclear. Thus, he was keen to let us
know that, for test particles, the contribution of ρ to the tensorial
part of the displacement is after all negligible with respect to the
contribution of f τν (HR, 025-05-10, 8).
Despite having to engage in considerable hand waving, Reich-
enbach did not seem to lose confidence in his theory. After making
some remarks about the geometrical meaning of non-symmetric
displacements30—which took the place of a shorter crossed-out
paragraph on p. 5— he concluded the new part III by proudly pro-
claiming that his theory had achieved a prototypical geometrization
of the Einstein–Maxwell theory. Other geometrizations, he claimed,
can differ “in their physical content,” but not in their “logical
structure” (HR, 025-05-10, 10). To avoid the misunderstandings that
had emerged in his correspondence with Einstein, Reichenbach
makes clear that even by deriving the field equations of the com-
bined gravitational–electromagnetic field from an action principle,
this would only be “progress in the mathematical formulation,” and
not something new physically (HR, 025-05-10, 10).
To achieve the latter goal a further step is needed: “The uni-
fication of gravitation and electricity,” Reichenbach writes, “can
only have a formal character inasmuch as the concept of matter in
the theory of gravitation is conceived only phenomenologically”
(HR, 025-05-10, 10). In general relativity matter is ‘black-boxed’ in28 As we shall see, this is indeed an essential trait of all attempts to impose a
geodesic equation on electromagnetism in a four-dimensional setting (see below
Footnote 44), but it can hardly be said that it is not a blemish.
29 Recall that iν ¼ ρuτ .
30 A symmetric displacement is characterized by the existence of infinitesimal
parallelograms HR, 025-05-10, 9–10: If four neighboring infinitesimal vectors are
parallel in pairs and equally long in the sense of the displacement, they will form a
quadrilateral (cf. note # added to p. 9). This assumption is in general not true for a
non-symmetric displacement.
32 I will limit myself to a terminological clarification. As we have seen, Reich-
enbach attributes to Weyl the merit of having discovered that the ‘displacement
space’ (the affine connection) can be defined (via the operation of the parallel
transport of vectors) independently from the metric. He refers us to “Gravitation
und Elektrizität” (Weyl, 1918a) and to Section 34 of the third edition of Raum, Zeit,
Materie (Weyl, 1919b). Reichenbach, however, adopted the more general view
introduced by Eddington (1921), in which the displacement does not even allow for
the comparison of length at the same place; Eddington restricted his approach to a
symmetric displacement in order to avoid what he called an ‘infinitely crinkled’
world (Eddington, 1921, 107). Reichenbach, however, abandoned this restriction
following Schouten (1922a, 1922b). Thus, what Reichenbach calls ‘Weyl's extension
of Riemann's Concept of Space’ should not be confused with what we usually call
‘Weyl geometry’. The latter is only a particular case of a symmetric displacement
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known to be built of electrically charged particles. According to
Reichenbach, unification of the gravitational and electromagnetic
fields can have a real physical meaning only if it delivers “an
electrical theory of matter” (HR, 025-05-10, 10), which would
account not only for the existence of elementary particles with a
certain mass and charge (electrons and hydrogen nuclei), but also
for their quantum behavior (the electrons’ privileged orbits around
the nucleus and the discontinuous transitions from one state to
another).31
On May 26, 1926 Reichenbach may have presented this
improved version of the note in Stuttgart at the Gauvereinstagung
of the Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft (the regional meeting of
the German Physical Society). The abstract of this presentation was
published under the title “Die Weylsche Erweiterung des Rie-
mannschen Raumes und die geometrische Deutung der Elektrizität”
(Reichenbach, 1926c). It is worth quoting at length, since it con-
stitutes a good summary of what Reichenbach's theory looked like
after his correspondence with Einstein:
“The meaning of Weyl's extension of the type of space is
formulated such that Weyl recognized the independence of
the operation of displacement and of the metric. The appli-
cation of the extended type of space to physics is however
characterized by a certain arbitrariness because it remains
open to finding certain objects that behave like the operation
of displacement. It is shown that these objects are the velocity
vectors of electrically charged mass points. With the aid of
this coordination, it is possible to interpret gravitational and
electrical phenomena as expressions of the geometry of a
Weylean space, so that electricity finds a geometrical inter-
pretation in the same sense as gravitation. The remarkable
thing here, however, is that this presentation does not change
the content of Einstein's theory of gravitation at all; the
geometrical interpretation is only a different parlance, which
does not entail anything new physically. Of course this geo-
metrical interpretation of electricity cannot solve the problem
of the electron, because it cannot achieve anything more than
Einstein's theory. The goal of this investigation was only to
show the limit of a geometrical interpretation as such. A
detailed publication will appear elsewhere” (Reichenbach,
1926c, 25; my emphasis).
However, this abstract registers an aspect not mentioned in either
the correspondence with Einstein or in the note. Reichenbach
revealed that what he wanted to achieve was a geometrical
interpretation of a physical field ‘in the same sense as gravitation’ in
Einstein's theory, i.e., one that was just as good as that attained by
general relativity. The geometrical operation of displacement has a
physical interpretation in Reichenbach's toy-theory, just like the ds
does in general relativity. Thus, Reichenbach claims to have pro-
vided not just a successful ‘geometrical interpretation’ of the
electromagnetic field, but an interpretation that was of the same
‘quality’ as the one general relativity provided for the gravitational
field. However, this was Reichenbach's point: the theory was not a
successful physical theory like general relativity. Thus, he con-
cluded, providing a geometrical interpretation of a physical field is
not in itself a physical achievement.
5.2. The Appendix and its Section 49
At the end of the abstract, Reichenbach mentioned that a
more detailed version of his presentation was in preparation. He
was clearly referring to a larger project he was involved with at31 Cf. Einstein (1923b) for a description of this field-theoretical program.that time. In December 1926 Reichenbach wrote to Schlick that
he was working on a two-volume book bearing the title ‘Philo-
sophie der exakten Naturerkenntnis’. “The first volume that deals
with space and time,” he wrote, “is finished” (Reichenbach to
Schlick, December 6, 1926; SN). Reichenbach wanted to publish it
in the forthcoming Springer series, ‘Schriften zur wissenschaf-
tlichen Weltauffassung’, directed by Schlick and Frank. The next
July Reichenbach wrote to Schlick that he had a publication
agreement with De Gruyter (Reichenbach to Schlick, July 2, 1927;
SN). The Vorwort of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre is dated
October 1927.
The Appendix of the book is 45 pages long. It was constructed
around the note that Reichenbach sent to Einstein in March 1926
(cf. Section 2). In particular, Section 49 is a redrafted seven-page
version of the first two parts of the note, bearing the title 'Beispiel
einer geometrischen Deutung der Elektrizität' (An example of a
geometrical interpretation of electricity). As pointed out on p. 358,
n. 1, the content of Section 49 was presented as a talk in Stuttgart,
together with an abstract summarizing the whole Appendix.
Reichenbach added Sections 46–48 (27 pages) to describe in detail
the geometrical setting of the theory that he had previously only
sketched. Section 50 (10 pages) draws the epistemological con-
sequences. I do not want to give a detailed presentation of the
Appendix here, which would require a separate paper (see Coffa,
1979, for more details).32 I will concentrate mainly on the differ-
ences between the note and Section 49.
At first glance, nothing much seems to have been changed also
in this final version. Reichenbach remained confident that Ein-
stein's objections had been answered. The definitions of the two
summands of the connection φτμν and γ
τ
μν are not modified, despite
Einstein's criticisms; no attempt is made either to derive the field
equations governing both fields from a variational principle, or,
more simply, to indicate how the electromagnetic field contributes
to the gravitational field. There is, however, a part of Section 49
that has been heavily modified with respect to the note. Inter-
estingly, it again concerns the interpretation of the equations of
motion.
Reichenbach possibly came to realize that Einstein had seized
on the weak spot of his geometrization here: since the charge-to-
mass ratio e=m varies from particle to particle, the trajectories of
charged particles in an electromagnetic field cannot be construed
as moving along the privileged paths of any single connection (cf.
Friedman, 1983, 197). Thus, Reichenbach was forced to paper over
the cracks.
(a) As he did in the note, Reichenbach concedes that if his
equations of motion are supposed to be valid for unit mass
particles of arbitrary charge, then unit mass particles of the
same charge “will engender [their] own displacement geo-
metry” (Reichenbach, 1928, 362; tr. HR, 041-2101, 506)
(depending on the strength of their charge), and will runwhere Kμν;σ ¼ κσgμν . Reichenbach's odd nomenclature, which is reflected in the
title of the Appendix, is probably one of the reasons the latter was read exclusively
in relationship to Weyl's unified field theory.
35 The reason for this restriction is not completely clear to me. Reichenbach
possibly wanted to avoid making the displacement also depend on the mass of
particles (particles with the same charge, but different mass, would produce their
own connection). He insists on several occasions (cf. Reichenbach to Einstein, April
4, 1926; AEA, 20-086, cited above in Section 4) that setting m¼1 amounts to
nothing but the choice of a norm, which does not differ with the choice of unit rods
and clocks to norm the ds¼1. The analogy seems to me only partially successful.
The choice of the norm is of course arbitrary in both cases; however, in Reich-
enbach's theory only particles withm¼1 travel on geodesics, but of course not only
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enbach, 1928, 363; tr. HR, 041-2101, 508). However, in
Section 49, the tone is quite different. Reichenbach now
recognizes that this solution is “questionable” (Reich-
enbach, 1928, 363; tr. HR, 041-2101, 508), since the existence
of a field should not depend on the properties of its probes.
Reichenbach is forced to admit explicitly that, in contrast to
the field Gμν (and its two components gμν and f μν), the
displacement space Γτμν does not exist in itself as a property
of space–time, but also depends on the properties of the test
particles, that is, on their charge ρ. The tensorial part of the
connection can be rewritten as φτμν ¼ ρf τνuμ to make this
more transparent.33 Since the Γτμνfield does not have
independent existence, Reichenbach admits that one can
doubt that a geometrization has been achieved at all. Clutch-
ing at straws, Reichenbach tries to suggest that the ambig-
uous status of the Γτμνfield should be seen as an argument
in favor of “Weyl's conception or perseverance,” which would
acquire a “deeper significance” (Reichenbach, 1928, 362; tr.
HR, 041-2101, 406): the paths of charged particles are a ‘lines
of preservation’ (Beharrungslinien) and only uncharged par-
ticles ‘adapt’ to the Gμνfield.
(b) Reichenbach must have sensed that not everyone would
buy into such an argument. Thus, in order “to avoid this
peculiarity of our formulation” (Reichenbach, 1928, 367; tr.
HR, 041-2101, 506), he also suggested an alternative ver-
sion of the theory which was not present in the note. The
tensorial part of the displacement is defined φτμν ¼  f τνuμ
and now depends only on the electromagnetic field (since ρ
is set¼1). Reichenbach now sees an additional difficulty;
the displacement depends on the particle four-velocity uμ.
Reichenbach, however, does not realize that this is also true
for the previous definition (the only difference is that
ρa1). Consequently, he treated the problem as a “mathe-
matical complication” (Reichenbach, 1928, 363; tr. HR, 041-
2101, 507) of the new definition, which, he claims, fortu-
nately disappears when the latter is plugged into the
equation of motion (viii).34 However, the most worrying
issue was this: now Reichenbach had to swallow Einstein's
objection. The equations of motion now apply only to unit
mass particles of a certain unit charge (Reichenbach, 1928,
363f; tr. HR, 041-2101, 508ff). Under the influence of the
electromagnetic field, a class of charged particles with an
arbitrarily chosen charge-to-mass ratio move on the
straightest lines and uncharged particles always move on
the shortest lines. Since there are two ‘norms’ that one
would naturally choose, the e=m of the positive and that of
the negative electron, there would only be two ‘natural’
geometries. Clutching at straws once again, Reichenbach
attempts to convince his readers that, for this reason, this
version of the theory provides an analogon of the equiva-
lence principle. After all, in general relativity the ratio of33 Note that the charge density ρ (for an incoherent charge fluid or e for par-
ticles), but not the mass density μ (or the mass m) appears as a parameter; hence
Reichenbach's insistence that his equations of motion are valid only for unit
masses.
34 Given that duτ ¼ dxτds , one can write (viii) as du
τ ¼Γτμνuμ dxν . Then, since
uμuμ ¼ 1, one gets duτ ¼ μντ
 
dxν f τν dxν. The additional term (beyond the one
entailing the Christoffel symbols) depends now only on position and not on the
velocity-vector (cf. Reichenbach, 1928, 362–363; tr. HR, 041-2101, 507–508 for
more details). Actually, one can proceed in the very same way with the previous
definition of the tensor φτμν , with the only difference being that the charge density
ρa1. However, in both cases if one switches back to Eq. (viii) with s as a scalar
parameter of motion, the velocity vector reappears. Thus, I am not sure why
Reichenbach believed himself to have gotten rid of the velocity-dependent con-
nection with this trick. On velocity-dependent connections, see Vargas (1991).the gravitational-charge-to-mass ratio is also arbitrarily
set¼1 (cf. Reichenbach, 1928, 366; tr. HR, 041-2101, 513).
The limits of Reichenbach's approach coincide with the limits
of this latter analogy. The electric-charge-to-mass ratio is not the
same for all particles, as the gravitational-charge-to-mass ratio is.
Despite Reichenbach's insistence, the theory precisely misses a
good analogon of the equivalence principle. Let's drop Reich-
enbach's curious restriction to unit masses to see this point more
clearly.35 In order to “construct a space which is independent of
the indicator” (Reichenbach, 1928, 363; tr. HR, 041-2101, 508),
that is, of mass and charge of the test particles, one is forced to
admit that only one class of particles with a certain charge-to-
mass ratio (say, electrons) follows the privileged paths defined by
the same displacement. To allow for all charged particles with
whatever mass and charge to move on privileged paths, then a
parameter k depending on the charge-to-mass ratio should
appear in the tensorial part of the displacement φτμν ¼ kf τνuμ (as
in Droz-Vincent, 1967). In this way, however, the displacement
“does not exist independently” (Reichenbach, 1928, 362; tr. HR,
041-2101, 506) from the internal degrees of freedom of the test
particles (cf. Quale, 1972; Cohn, 1972). Test particles with differ-
ent charge-to-mass ratios would follow privileged paths defined
by different displacements, one for each value of the parameter k.
The situation becomes even more desperate if one keeps in mind
that the displacement also depends on the four-velocity of par-
ticles uμ.
Reichenbach's theory clearly shows that, in a four-
dimensional setting, using a geodesic equation to describe a
non-universal force is possible, but the price one has to pay for
it is extremely high. Quite surprisingly,36 Reichenbach decided
that the price was worth the message he intended to convey,
which evidently was close to his heart. In the last chapter of his
Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (the one proceeding the
Appendix), Reichenbach concedes that, since the gravitational
field is measured by the same measuring instruments as those
used for geometry (light rays, rods and clocks) general relativity
has established a peculiar and previously unknown connection
between geometry and gravitation. However, Reichenbach says
loud and clear how this should be interpreted: “it is not the
theory of gravitation that becomes geometry, but it is geometry
which becomes an expression of the gravitational field”intervals ds¼1 have length.
36 The surprise derives from the fact that this attitude seems to be in open
conflict with Reichenbach's well-known definition of gravitation as a ‘universal
force’. As is pointed out in the first part of Reichenbach's book, one ‘geometrizes’
the gravitational field but not, say, the temperature field, because in the latter case
we would have different geometries for materials with different coefficients of heat
expansion (see Section 6). Notice that when Reichenbach claims that, in the second
version of his theory, there are only two ‘natural geometries’, he explicitly remarks
that the situation is nevertheless better than the case of a temperature field
(Reichenbach, 1928, 364; tr. 1958, 513). However, he should have then concluded
that, in the first version of his theory, there is a different ‘natural geometry’ for
every charge-to-mass ratio. As we have seen, Reichenbach attempts to avoid this
conclusion by claiming that the displacement Γτμν , since it depends on the prop-
erties of test particles, does not really exist as an independent geometrical field,
and the real field is represented by the Gμν . As Reichenbach sensed, however, one
can hardly speak of a ‘geometrization’. Reichenbach, as we have seen, could avoid
this conclusion only through some philosophical hand-waving.
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256).37 The long Appendix that follows was meant to add a
powerful argument to support this claim. The geometrical
interpretation of gravitation is merely “the visual cloak”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 353f.; tr. HR, 041-2101, 493) in which the
gravitational field can be dressed. However, it would be a mis-
take to confuse “the cloak with the body it covers” (Reich-
enbach, 1928, 354; tr. HR, 041-2101, 493). The electromagnetic
field can be dressed in an equally nice geometrical cloak without
reaching any significant result from a physical point of view.
The fact that the Appendix was not included in the widely read
English translation of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre is probably the
main reason so little attention has been paid to this issue. The
Appendix is muchmore ‘technical’ than the rest of the book, which has
a somewhat semi-popular tone. However, Reichenbach reassures
readers unable to manage the formal language that the section “pre-
sents nothing new, philosophically speaking, but merely constitutes an
application of the epistemological principles developed earlier in this
book” (Reichenbach, 1928, 331; tr. HR, 041-2101, 461). If one takes
Reichenbach's claim at face value, then the reading of Philosophie der
Raum-Zeit-Lehre with the inclusion of the Appendix is a valuable tool
for understanding one of the main messages of the book, if not the
main one. Reichenbach's monograph was not a plea for the ‘relativi-
zation of geometry’ induced by the gravitational field, but rather a
j'accuse against the rhetoric of the ‘geometrizaton’ of gravitation, which,
in the 1920s, had spread through popular and technical readings of the
theory of general relativity (Reichenbach, 1928, 294; tr. 1958, 256). If
there is something we can learn from general relativity, Reichenbach
argues, it is that abstract geometry has been lowered to physics, and
certainly not that physics has been absorbed into geometry.
Weyl, Eddington and Einstein had provided ‘graphical
representations’38 of the electromagnetic field in which they37 To fully understand this point one must keep in mind that according to
Reichenbach, in addition to the problem of the measurement of physical geometry,
which was introduced by Riemann, Helmholtz and Poincaré, Einstein introduced
the problem of a scientific explanation of physical geometry. Since the gravitational
field affects all measuring instruments in the same way, one may regard them as
‘free from deforming forces’; nevertheless one may still consider the gravitational
field as the cause of the fact that all measuring instruments happen to agree on the
same geometry. Reichenbach borrowed from Weyl the concept of ‘adjustment’
(Einstellung) (Reichenbach, 1928, 294; tr. 1958, 257), to emphasize that ‘causation’
here does not mean deviation from an alleged correct behavior (e.g., the Euclidean
one), but the surprising convergence toward a non-trivial one (which in the general
case is non-Euclidean). What is important in this context is the fact that in
Reichenbach's view, since the gravitational field is the cause of the behavior of our
geometrical measuring instruments, it exists independently from its peculiar geo-
metrical manifestation and cannot be reduced to it (cf. Reichenbach, 1928, 357; tr.
HR, 041-2101, 491). However one might judge Reichenbach's notion of causation in
this context, it must be emphasized that it does not represent a minor aspect of his
philosophy. Reichenbach uses the same Weylian term ‘adjustment’ to also refer to
special relativity (Reichenbach, 1924, 70–71). The whole issue would merit a
separate paper.
38 As we have mentioned, Reichenbach borrowed the expression from
Eddington (1925b, 312). Cf. Reichenbach (1928, 365; tr. HR, 041-2101, 510). How-
ever, in Section 15 of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, he attempts a more general
and formal definition: ‘graphical representations’ are structural analogies between
different physical systems (e.g., compressed gases, electrical phenomena,
mechanical forces, rigid bodies and light rays) which are realizations of the same
conceptual system (e.g., the axioms of Euclidean geometry). In this context this
means roughly the following. In Weyl's theory the vector field φi determines the
change of length of vectors; the curl of φi is the length-curvature tensor fik (Weyl
tensor). The fik satisfy the identity
∂f kl
∂xi
þ ∂f li∂xkþ
∂f ik
∂xl
¼ 0. This formula looks a lot like
Maxwell–Minkowski equations in empty space. Thus it was very suggestive to
interpret φi as the electromagnetic four-potential and its curl fik as the electro-
magnetic tensor. This conclusion is based only on a structural analogy, that is, it is
only a ‘graphical representation’. When Weyl attempted to give a concrete physical
meaning to φi in terms of the behavior of clocks which measure the length of a
time-like vector ds, the theory turned out to be empirically inadequate: atomic
clocks do not change their periods as a function of their space–time path (cf.
Einstein, 1918). On the contrary, in Reichenbach's view, general relativity is not
simply a graphical representation, but a natural geometry, or ‘proper geometricalhad intentionally forgone providing “‘tangible’ realizations”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 371; tr. HR, 041-2101, 519) of the operation of
displacement; the tacit assumption is that, once the field has been
cast in geometrical form, what looks “simple and natural”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 370; tr. HR, 041-2101, 518) would lead to the
correct field equations. This, however, would be nothing more
than a fortunate coincidence. In Reichenbach's view the Appendix
shows that, with some effort, one can do better; one can construct
a ‘proper geometrical interpretation’ of the combined gravita-
tional/electromagnetic field, providing a concrete interpretation of
the operation of displacement which allows a comparison of the
theory with experience. Going even further, by suggesting an
analogon of the equivalence principle, Reichenbach believed
himself to have achieved a ‘geometrization’ of the electromagnetic
field that was “no ‘worse’” (Reichenbach, 1928, 366; tr. HR, 041-
2101, 512) than the one provided by general relativity. Never-
theless, in contrast to general relativity, Reichenbach's theory
“tells us nothing about reality that we did not know before”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 368; tr. HR, 041-2101, 516). Thus ‘geometriz-
ing’ a physical field does not give us any privileged access to the
physical world. Reichenbach does not hide his hopes that this
result would contribute to freeing physicists from the “Sirens' song
[Sirenenzauber] of a unified field theory” (Reichenbach, 1928, 373;
tr. HR, 041-2101, 521). The “many ruins along this road,” Reich-
enbach argued, “urgently suggest that solutions should be sought
in an entirely different direction” (Reichenbach, 1928, 373; tr. HR,
041-2101, 521).6. Reichenbach and Einstein's distant parallelism field theory
It is of course highly significant that the critique of the geo-
metrization program—which has been neglected by most recent
readers of Reichenbach's monograph—is precisely the one that
attracted Einstein's attention. On December 1, 1927 Reichenbach
wrote to Einstein that he knew from Paul Hinneberg, the editor of
the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, that Einstein intended to write a
review of his forthcoming book. Reichenbach sent him the galley
proofs of the book and also added that he would send the
Appendix some days later, since it was still being typeset (Einstein
to Reichenbach, December 1, 1927; AEA, 20-090). Einstein's review
appeared in the first 1928 issue of Hinneberg's weekly magazine
(Einstein, 1928c). It is interesting to note that the only point where
Einstein expressed agreement with Reichenbach's approach con-
cerned the Appendix: “In the Appendix the foundation of the
Weyl–Eddington theory is treated in a clear way and in particular
the delicate question of the coordination of these theories to rea-
lity” (Einstein, 1928c, 20; my emphasis). He then went further: “In
this chapter just like in the preceding—in my opinion quite rightly—
it is argued that the claim that general relativity is an attempt to
reduce physics to geometry is unfounded” (Einstein, 1928c, 20; my
emphasis). Einstein mentions Reichenbach's treatment of the
‘delicate question’ of the ‘coordination’ (Zuordnung) of the theory
to reality; however he only explicitly agrees with Reichenbach's
stance on the problem of ‘geometrization’.
Indeed, one can find this attitude mirrored in the review of
Émile Meyerson's book on relativity (Meyerson, 1925), which
Einstein published in the same year (Einstein, 1928a). Meyerson
regarded relativity as a stage in a long process of the progressive(footnote continued)
interpretation’ in Reichenbach's parlance; it contains assertions about the system of
rods and clocks themselves—measuring the line element ds (and thus the gik)—and
not about its structural equivalence with other physical systems (Reichenbach,
1928, 365f.; tr. HR, 041-2101, 511). At that time there was confidence that the
prediction of the theory concerning atomic clocks would turn out to be correct.
39 The Γ alludes to the fact that this condition can be defined without refer-
ence to the gμν .
40 Schrödinger succeeded Max Planck at the Friedrich Wilhelm University in
Berlin in 1927. He held his inaugural lecture on July 4, 1929 (Schrödinger, 1929).
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Einstein of course disagreed; he regarded the ‘unification’ of
inertia and gravity as the major achievements of general relativity;
a unified field theory should further unify gravitational and elec-
tromagnetic fields rather than ‘geometrize’ the latter (Lehmkuhl,
2014). According to Einstein, “the term ‘geometrical’ used in this
context is entirely devoid of meaning” (Einstein, 1928a, 165; my
emphasis): we do not regard the Hertz-Heaviside field equations
as a ‘geometrization’ of the electromagnetic field because of the
geometrical concept of vector that occurs in these equations. On
the contrary, Einstein fully endorsed Meyerson's rationalist epis-
temology, that is, Meyerson's attitude about how the theory is
“coordinated with [zugeordnet] the objects of experience”
(Einstein, 1928a, 162). Einstein found in Meyerson's work an
emphasis on ‘the deductive-constructive character’ of relativity
theory, which fit his pursuit for a unified field theory.
Thus the apparent agreement between Reichenbach and Ein-
stein on the geometrization issue actually hides a somewhat
complicated dialectic. For Einstein, the very idea of a geometrical
interpretation of a physical field was meaningless, and what he
wanted to achieve was a unification of two different fields. On the
contrary, Reichenbach regarded the geometrical interpretation of a
physical field as a meaningful enterprise, which, however, offered
no guarantee of physical unification. Moreover according to
Reichenbach a good geometrical interpretation implies a ‘Zuord-
nung’ between the fundamental geometrical structures of the
theory and the behavior of suitably chosen probes; on the contrary
Einstein had come to realize that this operationalist approach was
not only unnecessary, but, it was a detriment to very project of a
unified field theory. This dialectic emerges more clearly in Reich-
enbach's discussion of Einstein's new attempt to develop a unified
field theory.
In spring 1928, during a period of rest after a circulatory col-
lapse, Einstein, as he wrote to Besso, “laid a wonderful egg in the
area of general relativity” (AEA, 40–69). On June 6, 1928 he pre-
sented a note to the Prussian Academy on a ‘Riemannian Geo-
metry, Maintaining the Concept of Distant Parallelism’ (Einstein,
1928d), a flat space–time that is nonetheless non-Euclidean since
the connection is non-symmetrical. On June 14, 1928 he submitted
a second paper in which the field equations are derived from a
variational principle (Einstein, 1928b). Reichenbach wrote to Ein-
stein with some comments on the theory on October 17, 1928:
Dear Herr Einstein,
“I did some serious thinking on your work on the field theory
and I found that the geometrical construction can be presented
better in a different form. I send you the ms. enclosed. Con-
cerning the physical application of your work, frankly speaking,
it did not convince me much. If geometrical interpretation must
be, then I found my approach simply more beautiful, in which the
straightest line at least means something. Or do you have further
expectations for your new work?”(Reichenbach to Einstein,
October 17, 1928; AEA, 20-92; my emphasis).
There are two aspects of this passage that should be considered
separately.
The first part refers to the mathematical-geometrical aspect of
Einstein's papers. The manuscript to which Reichenbach refers
seems to have been lost. However, from Einstein's reply on Octo-
ber 19, 1928 one can easily infer that Reichenbach must have sent
him the classification of geometries which would appear in an
article Reichenbach submitted in February 1929 (Reichenbach,
1929c, see below in this section). Einstein agreed that in principle
it was possible to proceed as Reichenbach suggested, “starting
with displacement law, and to specialize it on the one hand with
the introduction of a metric on the other side with theintroduction of integrability properties” (Einstein to Reichenbach,
October 19, 28; AEA, 20-094). Reichenbach in fact defines a
metrical space by imposing the condition dðl2Þ ¼ 0 to the dis-
placement space Γτμν, which in general is non-symmetrical; he
then obtains Einstein space by requiring that the Riemann tensor
Rτμνσ ðΓÞ vanishes.39 Einstein, in contrast, preferred the classifica-
tion he had given in his paper: Weyl's geometry allows for the
comparison over finite distances neither of lengths nor of direc-
tions; Riemannian geometry allows the comparison of lengths, but
not directions; and Einstein's geometry directions but not lengths
(Sauer, 2006).
This, however, was only a minor point. Reichenbach's further
remark concerning the physical application of Einstein's geome-
trical setting is, from a philosophical standpoint, more interesting,
even if Einstein did not comment on it. Reichenbach claims that, if
one really wants to provide a geometrical interpretation of grav-
itation and electricity, then his own approach was better after all.
Reichenbach uses his own toy-theory as a benchmark for a good
‘geometrical interpretation’ (but of course not for a good physical
theory). Reichenbach's theory provides a physical meaning to the
displacement operation and thus a physical definition of a
straightest line. On the contrary, Einstein's theory did not attempt
to provide a physical interpretation of the notion of displacement,
nor even the field quantities; if the theory has nothing more to
offer, Reichenbach claims (i.e., if the theory does not solve the
problem of the electron), it is merely a ‘graphical representation’
(cf. also Eddington, 1929 for a similar judgment).
In a note added by hand at the bottom of the typewritten letter,
Einstein invited Reichenbach and his first wife Elisabeth for a cup
of tea on November 5, 1928, mentioning that Erwin Schrödinger40
would also be present (Reichenbach to Einstein, October 17, 1928;
AEA, 20–92). It was probably on that occasion that Einstein told
Reichenbach about the physical consequences of the theory he
was working on. In the meantime, on November 4, 1928, an article
by Paul Miller appeared in The New York Timeswith the sensational
title “Einstein on Verge of Great Discovery; Resents Intrusion”. The
paper triggered the curiosity of the press. In the late 1920s
Reichenbach was a regular contributor to the Vossische Zeitung, at
that time Germany's most prestigious newspaper; not surprisingly
he was asked for a comment on Einstein's theory. With the
advantage of having personally discussed the topic with Einstein,
Reichenbach published a brief didactic paper on Einstein's theory
on January 25, 1929 (Reichenbach, 1929b).
Reichenbach conceded that Einstein's theory provided a uni-
fication of gravitation and electricity which had more than just
formal significance, since it made “new assertions concerning the
relation between gravitation and electricity in relatively compli-
cated fields”(Reichenbach, 1929b). However, he maintained his
skepticism by claiming that the theory was “only a first draft,
lacking the persuasive powers of the original relativity theory
because of the very formal method by which it is established”
(Reichenbach, 1929b, my emphasis). Reichenbach was clearly not
the only one to write about Einstein's new theory in the press. On
January 12, 1929—one day after Einstein submitted a third paper
on distant parallelism (Einstein, 1929b) to the Academy—The New
York Times published an article entitled ‘Einstein Extends Relativity
Theory’.
It was amid this atmosphere that, at the end of January, Ein-
stein wrote an angry letter to the Vossische Zeitung lamenting
Reichenbach's “tactless behavior” in violating the academic code
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On January 26, 1929, the curator of the literary section, Monty
Jakobs (cf. Badenhausen, 1974), defended the behavior of the
newspaper and forwarded Einstein's letter to Reichenbach (Jakobs
to Einstein, January 26, 1929; AEA, 73-230). Reichenbach wrote to
Einstein the next day with feelings ranging from surprise to anger;
he complained that Einstein did not write directly to him after all
he had done to defend relativity theory (Hentschel, 1982), and he
denied any wrongdoing (Reichenbach to Einstein, January 27,
1929; AEA, 20-096). On January 30, 1929 Einstein replied that he
was somewhat pleased by Reichenbach's annoyance, which was
the “fair equivalent” of the annoyance he had caused by feeding
the press private information (Einstein to Reichenbach, January 30,
1920; AEA, 20-099). However, Einstein quickly settled the dispute
to Reichenbach's relief (Reichenbach to Einstein, January 31, 1929;
AEA, 20-101).
On January 30, 1929 Einstein's paper was finally published in
the proceedings of the Academy with the vague title ‘On the
Unified Field Theory’ (Einstein, 1929b). On February 2, 1929
another semi-popular paper by Reichenbach was published in the
Zeitschrift für Angewandte Chemie (Reichenbach, 1929a) without
any reaction from Einstein. Einstein's anger at Reichenbach (which
might at first seem rather exaggerated) is understandable if one
keeps in mind the attention that the theory was attracting among
the public; Einstein might have been upset that a colleague and
friend would also contribute to the craze. At the beginning of
February the New York Herald Tribune (February 1) printed a
translation of the entire paper. Several days later The New York
Times (February 3) and the London Times (February 4) published
Einstein's own popular account. The ‘irrational exuberance’
towards the theory is well attested to by a letter Eddington sent to
Einstein a few days later, recounting that Selfridges—a British
chain of high-end department stores—had pasted all six pages of
Einstein's papers in its window (Eddington to Einstein, February
11, 1929; AEA, 9–292).
In the meantime, on January 22, 1929, Reichenbach had already
submitted a second and more technical paper, which only
appeared in the Zeitschrift für Physik in September (Reichenbach,
1929c). The paper offers a readable presentation of Einstein's new
theory; Reichenbach again presented his own take on the rela-
tionship between displacement and metrical space, and located
Einstein space as an alternative to Riemannian space, rather than a
generalization of it (Reichenbach, 1929c, 684–687). He then
showed how in Einstein's theory the Γτμν and the gμν are con-
sidered as functions of a parameter hνα (the ν projections on the α
orthogonal unit vectors forming the so-called n-bein)41:
gμν ¼ hμαhνα Γτμν ¼ hτα
∂hμα
∂xν
The n2 ¼ 16 quantities hνα—enough to include both the grav-
itational and electromagnetic field—play the role of the field
potentials defined at every point (Reichenbach, 1929c, 687). The
goal is to construct a suitable LagrangianH fromwhich the 16 field
equations for the field variables hνα could be obtained, as usual,
from a variational principle δ
R H, with variation respect to the hνα
(cf. Sauer, 2006, for more details).
After this semi-popular presentation of Einstein's geometry and
its physical application, Reichenbach added some remarks that are
interesting from a philosophical point of view. He pointed out that
there are two ways to unify two different physical theories. The
first is a formal unification, comparable to the relationship between
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formalism in classical mechanics (the
first can be Legendre transformed into the other without adding41 In contrast to Reichenbach, Einstein assigned Greek letters to the Koordinaten-
Indizes and Latin ones to the Bein-Indizes or tetrads indices: haν .any new physical knowledge); the second is an inductive unifica-
tion, exemplified by the relationship between Kepler and Newton's
laws (something new is of course added by moving from Kepler's
laws to Newton's theory of gravitation).
The first approach was the one used by Reichenbach himself in
his own ‘unified field theory’:
“The author [Reichenbach] has shown that the first way can be
realized in the sense of a combination of gravitation and elec-
tricity to one field, which determines the geometry of an
extended Riemannian space; it is remarkable that thereby the
operation of displacement receives an immediate geometrical
interpretation, via the law of motion of electrically charged mass-
points. The straightest line is identified with the path of elec-
trically charged mass-points, whereas the shortest line remains
that of uncharged mass points. In this way one achieves a
certain parallelism to Einstein's equivalence principle. By the way
[the theory introduces] a space which is cognate to the one
used by Einstein, i.e., a metrical space with non-symmetrical
Γτμν. The aimwas to show that the geometrical interpretation of
electricity does not mean a physical value of knowledge per se”
(Reichenbach, 1929c, 688; my emphasis)
Notice that, according to Reichenbach, the advantage of his
own approach consists in the fact that it provides a physical rea-
lization of the displacement operation, and also (Reichenbach
insists) an analogon to the equivalence principle. The disadvantage
is that it is only a unification of the representations of two physical
fields in a common geometrical setting. The second approach
is the one used by Einstein, and it presented the opposite
characteristics:
“On the contrary Einstein's approach of course uses the second
way, since it is a matter of increasing physical knowledge; it is
the goal of Einstein's new theory to find such a concatenation
of gravitation and electricity, that only in first approximation it
is split in the different equations of the present theory, while is
in higher approximation reveals a reciprocal influence of both
fields, which could possibly lead to the understanding of
unsolved questions, like the quantum puzzle. However, it
seems that this goal can be achieved only if one dispences with
an immediate interpretation of the displacement, and even of the
field quantities themselves. From a geometrical point of view this
approach looks very unsatisfying. Its justification lies only on
the fact that the above mentioned concatenation implies more
physical facts than those that were needed to establish it”
(Reichenbach, 1929c, 688; my emphasis)
Einstein's theory was claimed to be a unification of the dynamics of
two physical fields, i.e., a unification of the fundamental interac-
tions. However, Reichenbach argues that Einstein could achieve
this result only at the cost of dispensing with a physical inter-
pretation of the fundamental quantities.
Thus, according to Reichenbach, his own theory had the
ambition of being a ‘proper geometrical interpretation’ (or, one
might say, to provide a ‘natural geometry’), but it was physically
sterile; Einstein's theory sought to be physically fruitful, but it was
merely a ‘graphical representation’ (see also Eddington, 1929).
Clearly, for Reichenbach, only general relativity was able to com-
bine both virtues: it was a proper geometrical interpretation (the
ds, and thus the gμν are measured using rods and clocks) that leads
to new physical results. Reichenbach did not seem to realize (or at
least did not explicitly point out) that this epistemological stan-
dard had become hard to comply with in precisely the context of
the field-theoretical explanation of the electron that he was
calling for.
43 The question of whether the fundamental role of geometrical concepts is
only of “historical and traditional” or rather “logical nature” (Dantzig, 1956, 48) was
in fact robustly discussed in the physics community in the years following the
English translation of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre. As is well known, beginning
at the end of the 1950s, John Archibald Wheeler had tried to pursue what he called
‘geometrodynamics’; starting from the successful geometrization of the gravita-
tional field provided by general relativity, Wheeler investigated the possibility of
treating “fields and particles” not as foreign entities immersed in geometry, but as
“nothing but geometry” (Misner & Wheeler, 1957, 526). See above on Footnote 3 for
the so-called ‘already unified field theory’. However, the hope that “physics could
be brought into a geometric formulation,” as Steven Weinberg pointed out in his
celebrated textbook a decade later, “has met with disappointment” (Weinberg,
1972, 147). Thus Weinberg could defend what even today is a quite heterodox
position, that the “geometric interpretation of the theory of gravitation has
dwindled to a mere analogy” (Weinberg, 1972, 147). What is relevant is the ability
to make predictions about images on photographic plates, frequencies of spectral
lines, and so on, and it “simply doesn't matter whether we ascribe these predic-
tions to the physical effect of gravitational fields to a curvature of space and time”
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Cornelius Lanczos, who had started to work with Einstein in Berlin
at the end of 1928, also published a little semi-popular paper on
the Fernparallelismus theory (Lanczos, 1929). In a more extended
but also non-technical account, Lanczos (1931) distinguished two
different ways of conceiving of the coordination between theory
and experience: (1) a positivistic-operationalist entrenchment of
relativity theory, which requires a direct definition of the funda-
mental variables gμν or f μν, in terms of the behavior of some
physical systems used as probes. However, this approach fails in
the domain of the elementary particles, since there are no probes
smaller than the electrons. Thus the pursuit of a field-theoretical
interpretation of matter seems to require (2) a metaphysical-
realistic perspective, based on the conviction that the deep struc-
ture of nature is understandable only by means of speculative
mathematical constructions. There are few doubts that, around
1930, Einstein was leaning towards the second way (Norton, 2000;
Dongen, 2010). In his Fernparallelismus approach, e.g., no attempt
is made to give a direct physical meaning to the fundamental field
variables hνa (or
ahν in the notation suggested by Roland Weit-
zenböck; Einstein, 1929a, 1929b) considered in isolation. The jus-
tification of the field equations relies on the fact that they are the
most simple and natural laws that the h-field can satisfy (Einstein,
1930, 6; tr. 10).
7. Conclusion
Einstein soon abandoned the distant parallelism approach,
later taking up a five-dimensional approach again, but this time
using the tetrad formalism (Einstein & Mayer, 1931, 1932). While
Einstein was visiting Caltech in 1933, the Nazis came to power. He
never returned to Germany and instead landed at Princeton,
where he remained until the end of this life. Reichenbach moved
to Istanbul, attracted, like many other German academics, by
Atatürk's secular Turkey. The enthusiasm was short-lived. In April
1936 Reichenbach, fearing Weyl's opposition, wrote to Einstein
asking for his support in obtaining a position at Princeton
(Reichenbach to Einstein, April 12, 1936; AEA, 10-107). Einstein
answered that he had heard from Rudolf Carnap that Princeton did
not want to hire more Jews: “also up here not all that glitters is
gold,” he remarked bitterly (Einstein to Reichenbach, May 2, 1936;
AEA, 20-118). Reichenbach obtained a position at UCLA in 1938,
from which he would exert an enormous influence on American
philosophy of science.
The confrontation between Einstein and Reichenbach about the
philosophy of space and time was resurrected only a decade later
by Reichenbach's contribution (Reichenbach, 1949) to the Schilpp-
Volume in Einstein's honor (Schilpp, 1949). It concerned the very
same issue we discussed at the end of the preceding section. In an
unpublished and overall positive commentary on Reichenbach's
paper, Einstein disagreed in particular with Reichenbach's claim
that ‘the meaning of a statement is reducible to its verifiability’: “it
seems to me doubtful whether one can maintain this conception
of meaning for the individual statement” (AEA, 2-057).42
As is well known, Einstein raised this precise objection against
Reichenbach in the so-called “Reply to Criticisms” of the Schilpp-
Volume (Einstein, 1949b). At the end of a fictional dialogue
between Reichenbach and Poincaré (Einstein, 1949b, 677–678),
Einstein entrusted his epistemological views to the persona of an
‘anonymous non-positivist’ (or, as he put it elsewhere, a ‘tamed
metaphysician’; Einstein, 1950, 3): a theory has a ‘meaning’, a
physical content, only as a whole, even if its parts, in isolation, do
not find a direct physical interpretation (Einstein, 1949b, 678).42 The italicized words are in English in the original German text.Einstein's remark, as he confessed to Besso a year later, must be
understood against the background of the “Don Quixotian situa-
tion” in which one finds oneself in the search for a unified, non-
dualistic, field theory. The material structures (e.g., rods and
clocks), which are used as probes and give physical content to the
field quantities governed by the field equations, are supposed to
be solutions of the field equations themselves. Thus, no real defi-
nition of such quantities seems to be possible: “To really under-
stand my point of view you must read my answer in the [Schilpp]-
volume [Sammelband]” (Einstein to Besso, April 15, 1950; Speziali,
1972, 438–439).
Interestingly, in the Schilpp-Volume, Einstein points out
another consequence of this epistemological stance. In a context in
which the geometrical measuring instruments, rods and clocks,
would be treated as physical systems just like any other
(Giovanelli, 2014), the strict opposition between the ‘interval’, the
geometrical variable they measure, and all other non-geometrical
variables, also seems to lose its raison d'être (Einstein, 1949a, 61).
Thus the very program of “reducing physics to geometry”
(Einstein, 1949b, 61) becomes meaningless. Although Einstein
made this remark only in passing, as we have seen, his reflections
on this topic date back over twenty years and were occasioned
precisely by Reichenbach's toy-geometrization.
Concluding our reconstruction of this forgotten Reichenbach–
Einstein debate, I think that there are two lessons we can draw
from it.
From (a) a historical standpoint, it turns out that the Einstein–
Reichenbach correspondence inaugurated a philosophical reflec-
tion about the role played by geometric considerations in physical
theories. This issue, which is rarely addressed today, was not only
relevant for Einstein, as Lehmkuhl (2014) has recently shown, but
played an important role in Reichenbach's philosophy as well. In
particular, Reichenbach's (1928) monograph should be read as an
attempt to present general relativity as the crowning achievement
of a process of ‘the physicalization of geometry’, against the pre-
vailing opinion that it marked the beginning of the epoch of ‘the
geometrization of physics’. The decision not to include the
Appendix in the Reichenbach (1958) translation of Philosophie der
Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928) is probably why this issue
has never attracted the attention of Reichenbach's interpreters,
despite the fact that it is precisely this aspect that Einstein himself
emphasized in his review of the book. Reichenbach's philosophy of
space and time looks quite different if this issue is taken into
account, and, given his enormous influence, may have contributed
in quite different ways to the debate on the foundation of space–
time theories.43 The infamous ‘relativization of geometry’ (cf.
Giovanelli, 2013a, 2013c), with which Reichenbach's reading of(Weinberg, 1972, 147). The opposition between the geometrization of physics vs.
the physicalization of geometry was also discussed by Bergmann (1979), Einstein's
former assistant in Princeton and one of the major relativists of his time.
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background and what may have been his main concern begins to
emerge—the ‘geometrization of gravitation’.
Reichenbach's toy theory might, however, also be interesting
from (b) a systematical point of view, though for reasons Reich-
enbach would not have appreciated. His theory shows that, in a
four-dimensional setting, “the price for imposing a geodesic
equation of motion to describe a non-universal interaction”
(Aldrovandi & Pereira, 2013, 120) is not worth paying. The simple
reason is that a good analogon of the (weak) equivalence principle
that Reichenbach repeatedly brags about is missing. Ironically,
Reichenbach's Appendix offers possibly the best argument of his
1928 book to show that gravitation is a universal force, though
electromagnetism is not. The gravitational-to-inertial-mass ratio
mg=mi is a constant, but the charge-to-mass ratio e=m is not; thus,
pace Reichenbach, it is extremely cumbersome to impose a geo-
desic equation upon electromagnetism, and in this sense, to geo-
metrize the latter. One can easily construe an affine connection in
which one type of particle with a certain e=m travels on geodesics.
However, if one wants to have all charged particles moving on
geodesics under the influence of the electromagnetic field, there is
no other way than to introduce a separate connection for each
value of e=m. One can in principle proceed in this way (Droz-
Vincent, 1967). Given a connection (say the Levi-Civita connec-
tion), one can obtain a new connection simply by adding a suitable
three-rank tensor with two lower indices, and so on. If the latter
depends on e=m, then one would have as many connections as one
needs.44 However—if I am allowed to borrow my punchline—the
situation became “not unlike that in alchemy where a new
‘essence’ is invented to explain any phenomena not covered by the
previous ‘essence’” (Earman & Friedman, 1973, 357).4544 This approach was suggested, e.g., by Droz-Vincent (1967), and is aston-
ishingly similar to that of Reichenbach (although Droz-Vincent must have been
unaware of Reichenbach's Appendix). Just like Reichenbach, Droz-Vincent resorts to
a non-symmetric affine connection which is the sum of the Christoffel symbols and
a (1,2) tensor, which depends on the electromagnetic field and the four-velocity,
and the charge-to-mass ratio of the particle: Pραβ ¼ kF
ρ
αuβ (one can easily recognize
Reichenbach's definition behind the slightly different notation). The covariant
derivatives of the metric tensor are supposed to vanish, just like in Reichenbach's
theory. The consequence (the same one Reichenbach was forced to acknowledge) is
that the “affinity is not an ‘external’ property of space, independent of the particle”
(Burman, 1970); in particular, it depends on the charge-to-mass ratio (and also on
the four-velocity of every particle). On the problem of incorporating the particle
properties into the space–time geometry, see Quale (1972), Cohn (1972); see Vargas
(1991) on the problem of velocity-dependent connections. An alternative might be
to use a particular case of the Finsler metric, the so-called Randers metric (Randers,
1941) ds¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
gμνdx
μdxν
q
þe=m φμdxμ (where φμ is the electromagnetic potential).
Geodesics δ
R
ds in a Randers space are not geodesics in a Riemannian space, so that
charged particles of different types can have different Riemannian paths (Ste-
phenson & Kilmister, 1953). In this setting there is only one connection; however,
the metric depends explicitly on e=m and thus one needs (again) different metrics
for each type of particle. The only way to avoid this multiplication of geometrical
structures is to move to higher dimensions. In Kaluza–Klein-type theories, the
motion of any particle with an arbitrary value of e=m is associated with the same
geodesic in the five-dimensional space, but with different four-dimensional pro-
jections of the latter (Leibowitz & Rosen, 1973). An attempt in six dimensions has
been made by Bown (1970). An opposite thought experiment might be to try to
transform the geodesic equation of general into a force equation as in the case of
teleparallel gravity (Aldrovandi & Pereira, 2013). This might be useful in the case
where the equivalence principle turns out to be violated. In this case geometrized
gravity would not make much sense precisely for the reason we have suggested:
“test particles with different relations mg=mi would require connections with dif-
ferent curvatures to keep all equations of motion given by geodesics” (Aldrovandi &
Pereira, 2013, 120).
45 Earman and Friedman refer to Droz-Vincent (1967); see previous footnote.Acknowledgments
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